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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to identify factors that assist in switching from the default
strategy (resolution strategy) for interpreting presupposition triggers to the secondary one (accom-
modation strategy or rejection strategy), namely, mechanisms by which the context is made inap-
propriate for the presupposition of triggers in such utterances as: the professor went to Chicago
again. Previous research on how presupposition triggers are processed has discussed the follow-
ing two cases: those in which the entire proposition demanded by a presupposition trigger already
exists in the context and those in which no part of the demanded proposition is present. This pa-
per scrutinizes cases located somewhere on the continuum between the two ‘idealized’ cases, i.e.,
those in which part of the utterance is entailed by the context. By examining such cases, in which
it is not so obvious whether the hearer adopts resolution or accommodation/rejection, we derive a
hypothesis on our subconscious choice of a strategy for processing a presupposition trigger. The
hypothesis in this paper is that, given that presupposition triggers are in nature the focus of their
sentences, in case only part of a proposition demanded by a trigger is provided in the context,
several linguistic items (the trigger and other items expressing what is not provided in the context)
compete for the job of the focus of the sentence, resulting in difficulty in grasping the speaker’s in-
tended message. This hypothesis will, via its niche in the scope of explanation, show that multiple
factors interact in driving the hearer’s choice of a strategy for processing presupposition triggers.
Keywords: presupposition; presupposition trigger; resolution; accommodation; rejection;
informativeness; information structure; split of focus; again; too; futatabi
1. Introduction
This paper proposes a hypothesis on the decisive factors subconsciously used in choosing a pro-
cessing strategy for interpreting utterances carrying certain presupposition triggers.1 When one
says that Catherine went to New York again, it is usually commonly understood that she has been
there at least once before. If so, the hearer identifies the repetitive event verbalized in the utter-
ance as the commonly understood belief (resolution strategy). Alternatively, the speaker may say
1 This research throws light on processing by hearers, but the analyses given here can be expanded to intentions by
speakers.
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the same thing even if the hearer is not aware that Catherine has been to New York before, and
behave as if it had already been shared before the utterance. In addition to her explicit reactions to
the absence of the presupposition,2 the hearer has two choices: to develop the topic based on the
ad-hoc pseudo-presupposition in question (accommodation strategy), and to ignore the linguistic
item again, thus interpreting only the rest of the utterance (rejection strategy).
The processing of utterances carrying linguistic items such as again has been discussed in
previous literature (cf. Heim 1990, Beck 2007, Tiemann et al. 2014), and the above example illus-
trates three strategies that have been the topic of linguistic research long since identified. One of
the strategies in the example is concerned with the case where the whole proposition in the utter-
ance, except information described by the word again, is already shared as a presupposition by the
participants, whereas the other two strategies fall under the case where the participants are famil-
iar with no part of the proposition of the utterance. Generally, these ‘idealized’ cases have been
the only subjects of investigations on strategies for processing presupposition triggers, although
obviously there are other types of cases that occur frequently, namely, cases located somewhere
on the continuum between the two idealized cases. These continuum cases include ones in which
the hearer believes that only parts of the proposition of an utterance including again are shared
by the members of the conversation. In cases of this kind, it is not as obvious as it is in the
previously reported cases whether the hearer adopts resolution or accommodation/rejection. This
paper discusses such cases, because examining such cases can assist in constructing a hypothesis
of what conditions encourage the hearer to switch from resolution strategy (default strategy) to
accommodation or rejection strategy (secondary strategy).
The hypothesis to be suggested here is the one that covers examples outside the scope of the
hypothesis proposed by Sato (2018), which explains several examples from the aspect of infor-
mativeness. The remodeled hypothesis of this paper employs the notion of “focus” as developed
by Lambrecht (1994) and argues that difficulty in interpreting the main focus of an utterance leads
to a subconscious choice in favor of accommodation or rejection rather than resolution. The next
section briefly introduces terminology on presuppositions. In the following section, the hypothe-
sis proposed by Sato (2018) will be explained, and we will see that informativeness alone cannot
explain the adoption of resolution strategy in certain examples. Then, in section 4, as a first step
toward constructing a new hypothesis that covers the range of phenomena not dealt with by Sato’s
(2018) hypothesis, we will discuss that presupposition triggers tend to be the focus of their sen-
tences per se. After the explanation, in section 5, we will go on to the hypothesis that the focus
characteristic of a presupposition trigger serves as a factor in deciding whether to resolve or ac-
commodate/reject the presupposition. Section 6 will sum up the essence of the analyses in this
paper.
2 Repair is one of the possible explicit reactions. Conditions on occurrence of repair in interpreting presupposition
triggers are discussed by Glanzberg (2003).
70
2. Theoretical Background
This section explains basic terms related to presuppositions and processing strategies in cases
where a hearer encounters presupposition triggers.
2.1 Presupposition and Trigger
There are two different definitions of “presupposition,” one of which is based on truth-conditional
semantics, while the other is based on pragmatics. The phenomena to be discussed in this paper
lie within the realm of the latter. Levinson (1983) defines a pragmatic presupposition as follows:
(1) An utterance A pragmatically presupposes a proposition B iff A is appropriate only if B
is mutually known by participants
(Levinson 1983)
For example, utterance (2a) needs (2b) and (2c) to be mutually known.
(2) a. He regretted beating his wife.
b. He has/had a wife.
c. He beat his wife.
In actual conversations, the appropriateness of an utterance does not depend on whether certain
propositions are mutually known. Knowing a proposition sensu stricto entails that it is true and
that the person who believes it is in a position to have obtained enough evidence to know it (cf.
Hintikka 1962, Audi 2010). The appropriateness of an utterance in natural discourses cannot
depend on metaphysical truth but rather on our epistemological assumptions about metaphysical
truth, and thus being mutually known is too restrictive for the definition of presupposition. To
ensure the appropriateness of an utterance, furthermore, certain propositions do not need to be
believed, either. To judge the appropriateness, they have only to be mutually accepted by the
participants. Stalnaker (2002) defines acceptance as follows:
Acceptance [...] is a category of propositional attitudes and methodological stances to-
ward a proposition, a category that includes belief, but also some attitudes (presumption,
assumption, acceptance for the purposes of an argument or an inquiry) that contrast with
belief, and with each other. To accept a proposition is to treat it as true for some reason.
One ignores, at least temporarily, and perhaps in a limited context, the possibility that it is
false. Belief is the most basic acceptance concept: the simplest reason to treat a proposition
as true is that one believes that it is true.
(Stalnaker 2002: 716)
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Let us see what it means that propositions have only to be accepted. We can imagine the following
scenario: Ken always lies to Beth and Beth is aware of this. One day Ken tells Beth that he has
gotten married, and says (2a) to her. In this situation, neither Ken nor Beth believes that (2b) is
true, but when Beth understands (2a), she is able to use (2b) as the basis for an understanding of
(2a), and in this sense, (2b) makes the utterance of (2a) appropriate. As illustrated by this scenario,
if propositions are accepted just for the purpose of the conversation, they nevertheless support the
appropriateness of utterances. Considering this fact, the following definition of presupposition is
closer to being sufficient and necessary, especially if a presupposition is to be defined in terms of
appropriateness.
(3) An utterance A presupposes a proposition B iff A is appropriate only if B is common
ground for participants
“Common ground,” according to Stalnaker (2014), is a kind of propositional attitude3 and can
be rephrased with mutual acceptance for the purpose of conversation.4 This definition identifies
presupposition as a common-ground proposition determining the appropriateness of utterances.
Whether a proposition should be common ground is often decided by the use of certain lin-
guistic items. These items are named “presupposition triggers” (Levinson 1983). For example,
his and regretted in (2a) are presupposition triggers. The former demands that (2b) be common
ground and the latter that (2c) be common ground. This paper mainly deals with the triggers again
and too, but the analyses here can be applied to even as well. Therefore, the terms “presupposi-
tion triggers” in this paper refer to the set of again, too and even.5 Next, we will examine what
strategies hearers adopt when they encounter presupposition triggers.
2.2 Processing Strategy
According to Domaneschi (2016), when a hearer interprets utterances with presupposition trig-
gers, she subconsciously follows one of the three paths outlined in (4).
3 As the terms “knowledge” and “belief” are used to refer to what is known and what is believed, “common ground”
can be used to refer to what is common ground.
4 Stalnaker (2014) defines common ground with reference to the definition of mutual knowledge (cf. Lewis 1969,
Schiffer 1972). Clark (1992), however, defines common ground in another way.
5 The set is included in the list of so-called soft triggers (cf. Kripke 2009, Abrusa´n 2016), but this list includes triggers
that are not related to the phenomena and the analyses in this paper, and therefore this paper does not employ the
term.
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(4) a. Resolution: Identify the proposition in an utterance as common ground.6
b. Accommodation: Accept as presupposition the proposition that is demanded by the
trigger but is not common ground.
c. Rejection: Reject the trigger and therefore do not regard what is common ground as
presupposition of the trigger.
Interpreters usually try to adopt resolution first, but if they cannot, they choose accommodation or
rejection. In this sense, resolution is the default strategy, and accommodation or rejection is the
secondary one. Let us see the following example.
(5) Yesterday, Robin went to Nick’s house again.
If the hearer believes, at the time of the utterance, that Robin went to Nick’s house sometime
before yesterday, this belief will function as a presupposition (resolution). If she does not believe
it at that time, either accommodation or rejection takes place. If she thinks that the idea of Robin
previously having gone to Nick’s house is conceivable, she may accept it for the purpose of the
conversation (accommodation). In the case of accommodation, common ground, or context, will
not be referred to at all, especially to establish the created ad-hoc presupposition. In contrast
to the case of accommodation, if the hearer has a reason to doubt the presupposition, she will
ignore the presupposition trigger again (rejection), thus resulting in interpreting only the rest of
the utterance. In what follows, the hypothesis proposed by Sato (2018) on the mechanism whereby
accommodation or rejection rather than resolution takes place will be explained.
3. Informativeness of Presupposition
This section introduces a hypothesis on the condition of the switch from the default resolution
strategy to accommodation or rejection strategy in Sato (2018). Sato (2018) states that the pre-
supposition of again in (6b) is more likely to be resolved than the one in (7b) or the one in (8b),
and that the one in (7b) is more likely to be resolved than the one in (8b).
(6) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, John bought a flower for Amy again.
6 Domaneschi (2016) does not introduce the notion of common ground. For ease of discussion, this paper adopts the
term to define the three strategies.
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(7) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, John bought a flower for Beth again.
(8) a. John bought a flower for Amy.
b. Two days later, Kent bought a book for Beth again.
This is obvious from the contrast between (6b) and (8b). When we interpret (6b), the shared
situation described in (6a) is the presupposition of again, which can be rephrased as resolution.
In contrast, in interpreting (8b), (8a) cannot easily work as the presupposition of again, resulting
in accommodation or rejection. Strictly speaking, we adopt resolution if it is obvious from the
sequence of utterances that (8a) refers to a proposition that someone bought something for some-
one else rather than the literal interpretation. In cases of this kind, what matters is the event of
buying, and uttering (8a) is interpreted as meaning merely that a buying event happened. As a
result, (8b) can be regarded as expressing information on the repetition of the same kind of event,
and resolution of bought alone takes place. Resolution of this kind will be mentioned in section
5, but the main concern in this paper is the literal interpretation of utterances rather than the in-
terpretation which results from ad-hoc semantic bleaching, and thus here we will see cases where
accommodation or rejection takes place in interpreting (8b).
Since resolution is the default strategy, the difference in processing strategies above can be
considered to stem from the difference in whether there exists a common-ground proposition
qualified to serve as the target of resolution. Furthermore, taking into account the fact that reso-
lution is equal to regarding as presupposition a proposition shared by the context and an utterance
with again, shared propositions of this kind determine whether resolution is chosen or not. Stated
differently, characteristics of shared propositions are the primary factor in resolution. Taking this
into account, Sato (2018) hypothesizes that what yields the difference of processing strategies is
the “informativeness” possessed by shared propositions of this kind. Informativeness here can be
replaced with specificity. In fact, the difference among the examples above is the specificity (or
abstractness) of the propositions shared by the context, i.e., (6a), (7a), and (8a), and the utterances
containing again, i.e., (6b), (7b), and (8b). The shared propositions can be ordered as in Figure.
1 in the next page, according to their degree of abstractness. In Figure. 1, the propositions in the
higher positions have more specificity than those in the lower positions. The proposition shared
by (6a) and (6b) is located in a higher position than the one shared by (7a) and (7b) or the one
shared by (8a) and (8b), and the one shared by (7a) and (7b) is in a higher position than the one
shared by (8a) and (8b). These facts imply that we can more easily adopt resolution when a shared
proposition is specific than when it is abstract. Putting it another way, abstract shared proposi-
tions are more likely to cause accommodation or rejection than specific ones. For instance, the
proposition shared by (6a) and (6b)—i.e. John bought a flower for Amy—is more specific than
the one shared by (8a) and (8b)—i.e. AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE—and this lets
74
us choose resolution more often in interpreting (6b) than in interpreting (8b). In contrast, the
latter shared proposition is more abstract than the former one, and this leads us to subconsciously
choose accommodation of the ad-hoc presupposition—i.e. Kent bought a book for Beth—or re-
jection more often in (8b) than in (6b).
John bought a flower for Amy
John bought THEME for Amy John bought a flower forBENEFACTIVEAGENT bought a flower for Amy
AGENT bought THEME for Amy AGENT bought a flower forBENEFACTIVE




Figure.1 Hierarchical Structure of Abstractness (Sato 2018: 89)
Sato (2018) states that the requirement of informativeness for establishment as presupposition
is harmonized with the idea that what is asserted by the use of again is an unexpected repetition
of a certain event. Hearers assume that the use of again comes with a presupposition on an
event that is not expected to be repeated according to the parties’ belief systems. Therefore they
regard a proposition as a presupposition of again only if it is not easily inferred that an event
of the proposition in question ought to occur repeatedly, or only if the repetition of the event of
the proposition is noteworthy enough to bother mentioning. We can reason that, if propositions
shared by the context and an utterance with again are as specific as John bought a flower, then the
repetition of the events will usually be regarded as worth verbalizing, thus leading to establishment
of the propositions as presuppositions. That is to say, resolution will be chosen in this case. In
contrast, if shared propositions are as abstract as AGENT bought THEME for BENEFACTIVE,
then the repetition of the events will not be worthy of attention, which deprives the propositions
Papers in Linguistic Science, No. 25 (2019)　75
of the right to be presuppositions. In other words, the default strategy, i.e., resolution, will fail,
and accommodation or rejection will be subconsciously chosen as an alternative. Considering this
logic, the ordinary usage of again is harmonized with the hypothesis of informativeness.
In short, according to Sato (2018), the hypothesis on the informativeness, or specificity, of
presuppositions entails that specific propositions in the context can be presuppositions of again
(resolution), and that abstract propositions will not be chosen as presuppositions; rather, hearers
will instead create more specific presuppositions without reference to common ground (accom-
modation) or ignore the term again (rejection). This hypothesis can be applied to other presup-
position triggers. Below is an example involving too. The capitalization of Kate means that this
word is stressed by the speaker. Too requires an item marking a difference from the context (9a),
and in this example, the stressed agent Kate highlights that the agent in (9b) is different from its
counterpart in (9a), John. In this paper, items for comparison, like Kate, are called focus items, as
will be explained later.
(9) a. John went to Tokyo.
b. As far as I remember, KATE went to Tokyo, too.
The proposition of (9a) will be easily regarded as the presupposition of too. Now contrast (9) with
(10), where accommodation will be much more likely than in (9).7
(10) a. John went to Tokyo.
b. As far as I remember, KATE went to Kyoto, too.
In (10), what is shared by the context and the utterance that includes too is the proposition that
AGENT went somewhere, which is more abstract than its counterpart in (9), namely the propo-
sition that AGENT went to Tokyo. If the hypothesis of the informativeness on presupposition is
adopted, here as well, too will prevent presuppositions from being semantically vacuous. In this
case, to establish an informative presupposition, the hearer of (10b) will not regard the context
(10a) as presupposition, and thus will avoid establishing the uninformative presupposition that
7 As mentioned above, resolution takes place if some information is semantically bleached. For example, in order
for ‘compulsory’ resolution, (10b) reads Kate went somewhere, with ignorance of the concreteness possessed by to
Kyoto, especially in conversations in which the unfolded topic is who went somewhere. The concern of this paper
lies within the realm of the interpretations stemming from the hearer’s attempt to interpret the speaker’s intention
in expressing (10b) as written here, and thus interpretation through ad-hoc semantic bleaching will not be the main
topic in this paper. However, as an exception, the restitutive usage of a Japanese presupposition trigger futatabi,
which is accompanied by this kind of interpretation, will be discussed in Section 5, as its analysis will contribute
to refining the hypothesis suggested in this paper.
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AGENT went somewhere.8 This sets the stage for the choice of accommodation or rejection. If
accommodation is chosen, the hearer will infer the more specific presupposition that AGENT went
to Kyoto.9 If rejection is chosen, the trigger too will be ignored. As in the cases involving again,
accommodation and rejection of presuppositions of too can be explained by the hypothesis of the
informativeness of presuppositions.
Considering its ability to explain accommodation and rejection, one might think that infor-
mativeness seems to play a decisive role in accommodation and rejection. In fact, however, it
cannot explain every case of accommodation or rejection. Cases exist in which informativeness is
not a decisive factor, although it might urge accommodation or rejection. Now see the example
below. The presupposition of too in (11b) will be easily gained from resolution, even though the
information shared by the context and the utterance that includes too seems as abstract as that in
(10).
(11) a. Nick went to the park.
b. ROBIN went somewhere, too.
In this example, information shared by the context (11a) and the utterance with too (11b) is that
AGENT went somewhere, namely, the whole proposition of (11b) except for the focus item Robin
and the trigger too.10 The semantic content of this is the same as that gained from (10). If infor-
mativeness were the only factor for resolution, the interpreting strategy for too’s presupposition in
(11b) would be the same as that in (10b). Concretely, the strategy applied to both (10b) and (11b)
would be resolution, or otherwise accommodation or rejection. However, this is not what actu-
ally happens. In interpreting (11), the hearer usually regards the quite abstract proposition shared
by (11a) and (11b)—i.e. AGENT went somewhere—as a presupposition, therefore succeeding in
resolution without establishing an ad-hoc presupposition (accommodation) or ignoring the trigger
too (rejection).
Therefore, the choice of processing strategy is influenced by other factors, as well as informa-
tiveness. Here we have to realize that (11) differs from (10) in that the whole proposition except
for the trigger too and the focus item Robin can be found out from the context. It follows that
8 Precisely, AGENT here refers to someone other than KATE, but that is not the point here. What should be noted is
the difference between went to Tokyo and went somewhere.
9 Too in this example demands that a certain item (Kate) in the utterance be different from its counterpart in the
context, so that the accommodated presupposition will have an abstract agent.
10 The details of focus items will be explained in the next section. The point is that focus items function for com-
parison between the events described by utterances carrying triggers and those included in the context. In cases of
again, time expressions become a focus item and distinguish a presupposition event from an event of a proposition
of an utterance containing again. In this sense, focus items and triggers do not express presuppositional informa-
tion in nature. Therefore, focus items, along with triggers, do not have to be considered, as to what information is
shared by the context and utterances with triggers.
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whether the whole proposition of an utterance with a trigger lies in the context determines the
choice of a processing strategy, namely resolution or accommodation/rejection. Then, what needs
to be discussed is why the whole proposition of the utterance with a presupposition trigger should
be entailed by the context, especially for resolution. As a preparation to clarifying this, the next
section sheds light on the focus characteristics of presupposition triggers.
4. Focus and Presupposition Trigger
Lambrecht (1994) states that every utterance consists of expressions of “focus” and those of “pre-
supposition.” Here is an example. Small capital items express focus, which is to be explained
here.
(12) a. Where did you go last night?
b. I went to the movies.
(Lambrecht 1994)
What is asserted by the utterance in (12b) is that the place I went to last night was the movies.
The subject of this assertion is given, or common ground, as it is verbalized in (12a), while the
predicate is new. Therefore, in this example, combining new information with common ground
creates an asserted proposition. In utterances with a purpose of sharing information, information
combined with topical common ground is called focus, which contributes to making an assertion
on the topical common ground; topical common ground verbalized in an utterance is called a
presupposition, which is a notion different from “presupposition” defined in (3). At first glance,
it appears that the focus might be identified as the “information point” of a sentence,11 which
possesses the greatest concentration of information (Bolinger 1954) or as a message block which
the speaker wishes to be interpreted as informative (Halliday 1967). Nevertheless, this explana-
tion would not be accurate. As highlighted by Lambrecht (1994), focus itself does not consist
of expressions or words but rather of information. Now, we want to note that the presupposition
suggested by Lambrecht (1994) is different from that defined in Stalnaker (2014). For ease of
discussion, this paper hereafter refers to the presupposition in Lambrecht (1994) as an “Utterance
Presupposition” (U-Presupposition), and to that in Stalnaker (2014) as a “Common Ground Pre-
supposition” (C-Presupposition). In the next page, we can see a similar, but different, example
which assists in our understanding of focus and U-presupposition.
11 When “sentence,” not “utterance,” appears in this paper, it refers to an utterance’s aspect as a linguistic expression.
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(13) a. Where did you go last night, to the movies or to the restaurant?
b. We went to the restaurant.
(Lambrecht 1994)
The asserted proposition here is that the place we went to last night was the restaurant. In this
case, both the subject and the predicate of the asserted proposition are common ground, and
thus the asserted proposition is created by combining one part of the common ground with other
topical parts of the common ground. As can be seen from this example, focus does not need to be
new information. Before moving on to the relationship between focus and presupposition trigger,
we want to make sure that, in addition to the cases above, there exist cases where an asserted
proposition consists only of focus.
(14) a. What happened?
b. My car broke down.
(Lambrecht 1994)
In this case, the asserted proposition does not include parts of common ground,12 and the whole
of the sentence expresses focus. This kind of focus is called “sentence focus.” To summarize the
discussion by Lambrecht (1994), there are two kinds of utterances: the utterances where common
ground plays a role as a U-presupposition, which is combined with focus, and the utterances where
only focus exists.
Now, we will see focus-presupposition structures of utterances with presupposition triggers.
According to the terminology proposed by Lambrecht (1994), (15b), after the utterance of (15a),
has the structure of (15c).13 What constitutes the information structure in (15c) is not the lin-
guistic items themselves but rather the information corresponding to them. P below refers to
U-presupposition, and F to focus.
(15) a. Yesterday, John went to the library.
b. Today, he went there again.
c. [Today]F1 [he went there]P [again]F2
Here, again demands that the repetitive event he went there be common ground. Considering that
it is common ground, the event information in question serves as the C-presupposition of again.
When again is used, what is asserted by its use is not the C-presupposition but rather its repetition.
The C-presupposition is a topic on which repetition is asserted, and thus it constitutes part of the
12 Common ground needs to be activated (cf. Chafe 1994) at the point in time.
13 This information structure is constructed for the default interpretation of resolution.
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U-presupposition but not part of the focus, which contributes to making an assertion on a topic.14
In contrast, again, which has the meaning of repetition, is the focus. In addition, the repetition
indicated by again is, of course, based on two events occurring at different points in time. The
logical consequence of the use of again is the verbal implication or entailment of two points in
time. This means that, in (15), F2 (again) comes together with F1 (today), and thus they should
be treated as related parts of the focus. Considering this, (15c) can be rewritten as (16).
(16) [Today]F [he went there]P [again]F
In this paper, items expressing what is logically entailed by the use of presupposition triggers are
named “trigger-based focus items,” or “focus items” for short. The trigger again usually has a
trigger-based focus item related to time.15 In contrast, too can have trigger-based focus items of
various kinds, because the use of too entails comparison of a participant, location, or time of a
repetitive event, and focus items are often marked by stress. For example, in (11) above, the focus
item is Robin, as can be judged from the spoken stress placed on it. Some other presupposition
triggers such as even have focus items as well.
Note that triggers and trigger-based focus items do not always express what is focus of an
utterance. Consider the following example. (17b) is a response to the question (17a).
(17) a. Did you hear that John went to the library again today?
b. I know he went there again today.
c. [I]P1 [know]F [he went there again today]P2
In addition to I, the proposition John went to the library again today in (17b) is now a U-
presupposition. However, if attention is paid to the internal information structure of the presup-
position itself, we can see that there is a presupposition-focus structure inside the presupposition.
FINT is the focus inside the U-presupposition P2 and PINT is the U-presupposition inside P2.
(18) a. I know that he went there again today.
b. [I]P1 [know]F [[he went there]PINT [again]FINT [today]FINT ]P2
14 It should be stressed that so-called “given” information (cf. Lambrecht 1994), or common ground in this paper,
does not always become a U-presupposition. Given information can, in many cases, be the focus of an utterance.
What is stated here is that if a proposition that is common ground is demanded by presupposition triggers, it is
a U-presupposition.
15 Two different places can indicate that what happens at one place is different from what happens at the other, and
thus sometimes places or other items become trigger-based focus items.
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Whether they are embedded in a subordinate clause or not, a piece of information that is expressed
by presupposition triggers and trigger-based focus items is more foregrounded than certain propo-
sitions are, and hence information of this kind should be called a “relative focus,” as opposed
to a “relative U-presupposition” or a “relative presupposition.” In (18b), the unity of today and
again is a relative focus contrasted with relative presupposition, namely, John went to the library.
In this sense, presupposition triggers and trigger-based focus items can be considered to express
what is the relative focus in any utterance. In this section, we have seen that, in utterances with
presupposition triggers, the triggers and focus items can be characterized as expressions of focus,
and the C-presupposition of the triggers function as U-presuppositions, which are combined with
focus for the creation of a message. Even when a sentence containing triggers is embedded in a
subordinate clause, the relationship between triggers/focus items and C-presuppositions will be
maintained as that between relative focus and relative presuppositions. Next, with reference to
the discussion here, we present a revised hypothesis on the choice of accommodation or rejection,
which will be a key to identifying why the whole proposition of an utterance with a trigger needs
to be in the context for resolution.
5. Split of Focus and Plurality of Asserted Propositions
This section establishes a new hypothesis on accommodation or rejection by offering an answer
to the question stemming from the difference between (10) and (11). This question will be tackled
from the perspective of information structures as discussed in section 4. Now, let us consider the
information structures of (10b) and (11b). When the hearer of (10b) and (11b) attempts to adopt
the default resolution strategy, she subconsciously adjusts the scope of too to the phrases express-
ing common ground information, because resolution is an identification of verbalized information
in the scope as common ground. The resulting information structures will be represented as (19)
and (20), respectively.16 Here, the elements of the information structures are information, not
linguistic expressions.
(19) (As far as I remember) [KATE]F1 [went]P [to Kyoto]F2 [too]F1
(20) [ROBIN]F [went somewhere]P [too]F
As mentioned in section 3, (11b) differs from (10b) in that all the parts of the utterance except
for the focus item and too express common ground information. In attempting to resolve the C-
presuppositions of too, the hearer first adjusts the scope of the trigger to the phrases expressing
16 As far as I remember in (10b) plays a role in informing the hearer of the degree of belief in the asserted proposi-
tion. In this sense, the expression contributes to the illocutionary act of assertion (cf. Austin 1962, Searle 1979,
Vanderveken 1990), but does not constitute part of the asserted proposition. For this reason, this paper regards the
expression not as part of the focus.
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common ground information in the utterances. Therefore, the C-presupposition part in (10b) is
different from that in (11b). As a C-presupposition becomes a U-presupposition, the difference in
the range of C-presupposition results in a difference in that of U-presupposition, or in the range of
focus. In (20), Robin and too serve as the focus, and, as Robin corresponds to a trigger-based focus
item, these two function together as the focus. (19), in contrast, possesses the following elements
of focus: Kate, to Kyoto, and too. Like Robin in (20), Kate corresponds to a trigger-based focus
item, and therefore the set of Kate and too serves as the focus. What causes the difference in
the range of focus is the content of the phrase to Kyoto in (19). This is not information of a
trigger-based focus item, and its being the focus has nothing to do with Kate and too also being
the focus. (19), therefore, suggests that (10b) has two independent elements of focus. This paper
calls this phenomenon, i.e., when one utterance contains two unrelated elements of focus, a “split
of focus.” The split of focus in (19), or (10b), brings about two possible asserted propositions,
namely, in addition to John, Kate went somewhere and Kate went to Kyoto. This plurality of
asserted propositions makes it hard to interpret what the intended message is, and (10b) needs to
be reinterpreted so that the reinterpreted information structure does not contain two independent
elements of focus. Then, all that is required of the hearer is the reinterpretation of the scope of too
from only the phrase expressing the information already in the context (went) to the whole of the
utterance except for the focus item (went to Kyoto) or to no part of the utterance.
This can be rephrased as the switch from resolution strategy (to identify information in the
utterance as that of the context) to accommodation (to pretend to regard the information of the
whole utterance except for the focus item and too as common ground) or to rejection (to ignore the
trigger). If accommodation takes place, the hearer of (10b) will create an ad-hoc C-presupposition
went to Kyoto, thereby interpreting this as the U-presupposition17. The resulting focus consists of
Kate and too, leading to the only asserted proposition that in addition to someone else, Kate went
to Kyoto. If rejection takes place, the hearer will ignore too, and two other interpretations will
be possible. One is that Kate and to Kyoto constitute a set of focus elements contrasted with the
U-presupposition went. This interpretation will be accepted if the hearer judges that the event of
going is the unfolded topic of the conversation, and thinks that the agent and the goal constitute a
set of focus elements. This regrouping of the agent and the goal into a set of focus elements cannot
be achieved without abandoning too, for too requires one of the participant expressions as a focus
item, conferring the right to express focus on it alone and preventing it and other participants from
being a set of focus elements.18 Again, note that it is hard to interpret that Kate and to Kyoto serve
as individual elements of focus, which causes a split of focus. The other possible interpretation is
that (10b) has sentence focus. In this interpretation, went in (10b) does not have a connection with
that in (10a) in that the presence of went in (10a) does not motivate the use of went in (10b), and
went in (10b) is a constituent of the focus. In short, in both cases of accommodation and rejection,
17 If accommodation is adopted, went in went to Kyoto is not identified as went in (10a). The whole of went to Kyoto
is an ad-hoc C-presupposition created by the hearer.
18 If to Kyoto is interpreted as referring merely to somewhere, there will not be a split of focus.
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split of focus can be avoided. Considering this explanation of the difference between (19) and
(20), split of focus will be the decisive factor in accommodation or rejection.
It seems hard, though, to apply this explanation upon adopting either accommodation or rejec-
tion as opposed to resolution to utterances like (21b), which follows (21a). In (21b), if the hearer
tries to adopt resolution and subconsciously adjusts the scope of again to linguistic items express-
ing common ground information, the scope will be cooked a rice bowl in Japan, which verbalizes
C-presupposition, and therefore U-presupposition. This simultaneously means that Mike is not
inside the scope of again, such thatMike and again seem to cause split of focus. If so, accommo-
dation or rejection should be adopted, but in practice, resolution will be adopted, possibly without
hesitation. We can easily interpret the utterance as meaning that, besides John, Mike cooked a rice
bowl in Japan, resulting from identifying cooked a rice bowl in Japan in (21b) as the counterpart
to that in (21a), i.e., by adopting resolution without split of focus.
(21) a. Last year, John cooked a rice bowl in Japan.
b. This year, Mike cooked a rice bowl in Japan again.
Here it should be doubted that Mike and again individually express focus. When again is in an
utterance, trigger-based focus items usually mark a point in time. This, as mentioned above, is
because repetitive events necessarily happen at different points in time, and because the verbal-
ization of two different points in time ensures that the two repetitive events are not identified
with each other. Now what should be realized is that repetition of events can be accompanied by a
difference in participants as well as a difference in occurrence time. This is exemplified by the dif-
ference between (21a) and (21b). The event of (21a) has John as an agent, while that of (21b) has
Mike. This kind of uniqueness to one event at a certain time provides the expression of the unique
participant in question with the ability to serve as a trigger-based focus item, especially if it is
regarded as an essential marker of the difference between two events instead of time expressions
that serve as default markers, or in some cases along with time expressions. In the case of (21b),
Mike, along with time expressions, clearly informs hearers that the event of (21b) is different from
that of (21a), and thus Mike should be regarded as a trigger-based focus item. Considering this,
(21) does not make a good counterexample against the hypothesis of split of focus. Note that, in
utterances like that in (8b), accommodation or rejection usually takes place. Many of the event
participants in (8a) are different from their counterparts in (8b). Even if one of several expressions
about participants like the agent Kent is regarded as a trigger-based focus item, the existence of
the rest demands a plurality of asserted propositions as seen in (10b). Therefore, it is quite hard
to adopt resolution in such a case.
Next, we want to consider the so-called restitutive usage of again (cf. Beck 2007), because
this phenomenon offers a means of scrutinizing the condition of split of focus. (22) and (23)
are examples using the Japanese presupposition trigger futatabi, which corresponds to again in









































“Last year, Taro left Tokyo. This year, he came back to Tokyo again.”
Futatabi in (22) is used to mark repetition of a certain event. In this example, what was repeated
is Taro leaves Tokyo. This usage is called “repetitive.” In contrast, although it can be interpreted
as repetitive, futatabi in (23) can also be interpreted as marking a backward transition to a certain
situation shared by the speaker and the hearer rather than a repetition of the whole described event;
in this interpretation, it is implied that the common ground situation Taro is in Tokyo has happened
two or more times. This usage is referred to as “restitutive.”19 By interpreting futatabi in (23) as
restitutive, (23) suggests that the event Taro comes back to Tokyo was not repeated.
Here, the information structure of the restitutive usage of futatabi is the topic to be discussed.
In (23), the scope of futatabi is Taro was in Tokyo, which is not verbalized in the utterance with
futatabi but is included in the event of Taro came back to Tokyo, while the motion part of came
back to Tokyo does not lie within the scope of futatabi especially in the restitutive interpretation.
Then, Taro was in Tokyo is a C-presupposition, which makes it also a U-presupposition. The
trigger futatabi and the focus item this year jointly express the focus. The problem here is the
motion part of came back to Tokyo, which lies outside the scope of futatabi. This seems to cause
split of focus, which leads to giving up on resolution (trying to identify information in the utterance
as that in the context) and adopting either accommodation (treating the proposition described by
the whole utterance except for the focus item and the trigger as common ground, and regarding
only information of the trigger and the focus item as the focus) or rejection (ignoring the trigger).
In practice, however, the hearer does not abandon resolution in interpreting futatabi in (23) as
restitutive. Without split of focus, the hearer of (23) can easily understand that what happened
twice was Taro is in Tokyo, and can leave the motion part of came back to Tokyo outside the scope
of futatabi.
Then, in order to reveal why split of focus does not occur in (23), we need to clarify the
difference between to Kyoto in (10) and came back to Tokyo in (23), that is to say, between the
19 This paper discusses a prototypical example of the restitutive usage; that is, an example that can be interpreted as
meaning that common ground situation has happened two or more times. As will be mentioned below, resolution
easily takes place in examples of this kind, although they include new information. To develop the hypothesis of
split of focus, this paper scrutinizes the prototypical example, and for the same reason, cases will not be discussed
in which no information in an utterance containing restitutive futatabi is common ground.
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expression that causes split of focus and the one that does not. One obvious difference between
them is in relation to the context. To Kyoto cannot be inferred from to Tokyo in the context, nor can
to Tokyo be inferred from to Kyoto, whereas came back to Tokyo in (23) refers to an event logically
entailing the resulting situation was in Tokyo, which is already common ground when came back
to Tokyo is understood.20 In this sense, whereas both to Kyoto and came back to Tokyo express new
information in the conversation, only the latter simultaneously refers to information that is already
common ground at that time. This fact provides us with an insight into why the unity of the trigger
futatabi and the focus item this year does not compete with the motion part of came back to Tokyo
for the role of focus, resulting in no split of focus. One possible reason is that participants in the
conversation realize that the speaker intends to share with them, by using the expression came
back to Tokyo, that the common ground situation of is in Tokyo happened twice (repetition on
common ground information), and that the motion part of came back to Tokyo (new information)
is not to be communicated. In other words, it is recognized in the conversation that the speaker
refers to common ground information by an expression referring to information that consists of
common ground information and new information. Of course if the speaker wants to express
a backward transition to a situation already in the context, it seems reasonable for the speaker
simply to express this by saying that kotosi Taroo-wa futatabi Tookyoo-ni ita, meaning this year
Taro was in Tokyo again. However, the Japanese term futatabi requires the scope to be a dynamic
event, not a situation. This semantic restriction justifies the verbalization of a dynamic event to
communicate a situation. For this reason, participants in the conversation accept came back to
Tokyo as expressing was in Tokyo, which in turn gives a clear explanation on why split of focus
does not occur. The utterance of (23) does not possess two individual elements of focus. Stated
differently, the motion part of came back to Tokyo does not serve as the focus of the utterance.21
Therefore, the hearer can adopt resolution as opposed to accommodation or rejection.22
This explanation is harmonized with the idea that (10b) causes split of focus. One might think
that, if common ground information that constitutes part of information carried by a new linguistic
item prevents split of focus, information shared by the context and an utterance containing a trigger
20 Already shared information here is different from information found out only for understanding utterances involv-
ing triggers, e.g., went somewhere shared by John went to Tokyo and Kate went to Kyoto, too. Note that, if to
Tokyo in (10a) is commonly understood as somewhere for some reason, went somewhere will be the already shared
information in question. Then, (10b) will be easily regarded as meaning that KATE went somewhere, too, resulting
in resolution.
21 This does not entail that this kind of information is ignored, because it is possible that information of this kind
will be treated as C-presupposition or U-presupposition in the following phases of the conversation. Therefore,
someone might want to treat it as a kind of focus. In order to distinguish this from what is called focus in this
paper, it may be more appropriate to term the latter kind of focus the “main focus.”
22 The analysis so far can be applied to other triggers such as the English terms again, too, and even. Of course, the
semantic restriction seen in futatabi may not be seen in other triggers, and other factors may encourage the use of
expressions referring partially to new information to mean common ground information, not the new information
in question.
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such as too, e.g. went somewhere shared by went to Tokyo and went to Kyoto, would prevent split
of focus, too, because information of this kind should be regarded as a kind of common ground.
However, as mentioned above, split of focus does occur in this case. Information of this kind
is not included in the set of information that has been activated (cf. Chafe 1994) before in the
conversation, and thus participants in the conversation do not regard it as the potential basis for
asserting something else. Therefore, even if a new item partially refers information that can be, at
the time of the utterance of the item, found out in what preceding expressions mean, it cannot be
interpreted as used to mean the information in question. That is to say, what has been common
ground can function as the basis for following assertions, whereas what has become common
ground cannot be the basis for the assertion through which it has become common ground.
Note that, information of this kind can be the basis for the utterance and the new informa-
tion part referred to by the new item does not cause split of focus if antecedent utterances are
interpreted as meaning what serves as the basis for utterances involving triggers. For example, if
the hear of (10a) believes that it means that John went somewhere rather than the more concrete
proposition John went to Tokyo, went somewhere has been common ground when she hears (10b).
In case the antecedent utterance is originally based on the topic went somewhere, (10b) can eas-
ily be regarded as meaning Kate went somewhere, too, followed by the adoption of resolution.
Likewise, split of focus does not occur if it is possible to reinterpret what the discussion has been
on. If the hearer of (10b) can reinterpret (10a) as meaning John went somewhere, it can be, on
the spot, regarded as what has been common ground, and the hearer can adopt resolution with-
out confusion with regard to what the speaker really intends to assert. For this to be realized, it
needs to be natural that (10a) means John went somewhere, and thus if, as a result of reflecting on
how the discourse came to (10a), the hearer feels awkward with this reinterpretation, it cannot be
realized.
Now we can refine the explanation of the condition on split of focus, with reference to this
analysis of the restitutive usage of futatabi. In the interpretation of the default resolution strategy,
if, in addition to a presupposition trigger and focus items, an utterance contains items expressing
new information, the hearer can identify several individual elements of focus. This is what has
been called split of focus in this paper. Split of focus attaches an utterance with several possible
asserted propositions, causing confusion with regard to the speaker’s intentions. Therefore, the
hearer is likely to give up on resolution and adopt accommodation or rejection as an alternative.
This is why a split of focus leads to accommodation or rejection. As mentioned earlier, in utter-
ances with presupposition triggers, if items expressing new information partially refer to already
shared information, the hearer recognizes that the intention behind the usage of these items is
to refer to the shared information, and therefore she does not regard them as expressing what is
called focus in this paper. This means that, in such cases, split of focus does not occur, and the
hearer adopts the strategy of resolution. Summing up the details of the hypothesis suggested here,
split of focus in utterances with triggers, which results in accommodation or rejection, occurs only
if there are new items other than the triggers and focus items, and if the items in question do not
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refer to common ground information at all. This hypothesis of split of focus, whose coverage
of phenomena is larger than that of the hypothesis of informativeness as described in section 3,
explains the mechanism whereby accommodation or rejection takes place.
6. Conclusion
This paper has suggested a new hypothesis on hearers’ switch from the default resolution strategy
to accommodation or rejection strategy, especially in interpreting an utterance with a trigger such
as again. Accommodation or rejection usually takes place if the whole information expressed
by an utterance with a presupposition trigger is unfamiliar to the hearer, but this is not the only
situation in which it can occur. Even if some parts of the information referred to in an utterances
can be identified from information in the context, such utterances can sometimes be interpreted
more easily by the processing strategy of accommodation or rejection than by the default strategy
of resolution. Sato (2018) mentions the possibility that informativeness determines whether a
hearer will adopt resolution or accommodation/rejection. If what can be found out in the context
as a candidate for C-presupposition is abstract, or uninformative, asserting a repetition of it does
not contribute to information exchange, which is the purpose of the assertion. This causes a switch
in processing strategy from resolution to accommodation or rejection.
There are some examples, however, that this hypothesis on informativeness cannot explain.
Therefore, this paper has asserted, from the perspective of information structure as proposed by
Lambrecht (1994), that when new information other than presupposition triggers and focus items
is included in the utterance, split of focus occurs unless the new information in question consists
of new parts (e.g. motion part of came back to Tokyo in (23)) and given parts already in the context
(e.g. was in Tokyo in (23)). Split of focus allows there to be several possible asserted propositions,
which makes it hard to understand what the message intended by the speaker really is. As a result,
the need to reinterpret the information structure arises. This need is satisfied by regrouping the
C-presupposition, i.e., by pretending to think of the information in the whole utterance except for
the trigger and the focus item as common ground and adjusting the scope of the trigger to the
phrases expressing the newly established common ground. This is the pattern of the switch from
resolution to accommodation. The need for the reinterpretation of the information structure can be
satisfied in another way as well. If the trigger is ignored, the utterance can be interpreted as having
the former U-presupposition and a new focus consisting of formerly-individual focus elements.
In addition, if rejection is adopted, the utterance can be regarded as having a sentence focus. A
sensible interpretation of the utterance’s focus is thus possible. This is the pattern of the switch
from resolution to rejection. In both cases, split of focus is the decisive factor in abandoning
the strategy of resolution. In order to create a comprehensive model of the mechanism whereby
processing strategy for presupposition triggers is subconsciously chosen, the hypothesis of split
of focus needs to be combined with hypotheses on what serves as a factor for choosing between
accommodation and rejection. The resulting model will be capable of serving as the basis for
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future research grounded in quantitative verification.
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